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Introduction
In his introduction to literary theory for tertiary 
students, Jonathan Culler (2011) writes that the 
endless nature of theory can be overwhelming. A 
field of research may appear exhilarating in its infinite 
possibilities, but the very impossibility of mastery may 
also prove immobilising for a beginning researcher. 
However, as Culler notes, this is “the condition of life 
itself” (p. 16), and the rewards of a researcher are not 
necessarily located at a specific destination, but in 
moving forward, testing knowledge and assumptions, 
asking new questions and seeing the world in 
different ways (p. 16-7). These comments are apposite 
in any number of fields, but they are particularly 
relevant to teachers, whose presence in the classroom 
implicitly indicates that they have achieved a level of 
mastery in their area(s) of study. Culler’s reflections 
raise some interesting questions for teachers in all 
sectors—from early childhood specialists and primary 
teachers who are trained in a range of subjects 
and skills to high school teachers who specialise in 
discipline areas. It is the very nature of knowledge 
and theory—articulated by Culler—that provides the 
guiding question for this paper: What does it mean for 
a teacher to “know well”?
Despite the overwhelming support for a shift for 
teachers from “sage on the stage” to “guide on the 
side”, it seems self-evident that teachers still need 
mastery over their subject. Ball, Thames and Phelps 
(2008) illustrate this point, explaining that the need 
to research content delivery was clear “[b]ecause 
it seemed obvious that teachers need to know the 
topics and procedures that they teach” (p. 395). This 
paper proposes that it is the seemingly “self-evident” 
nature of content knowledge that obscures a range of 
epistemic questions that could illuminate pedagogical 
issues and improve teaching praxis at all stages of 
career development. 
The New South Wales Quality Teaching Model 
(QTM) (NSW DET, 2003) identifies three dimensions of 
quality teaching: Intellectual quality, Quality learning 
environment and Significance. The QTM breaks 
down the field of Intellectual quality into six areas: 
deep knowledge; deep understanding; problematic 
knowledge; higher-order thinking; metalanguage; 
and substantive communication (p. 9). Faull’s (2009) 
paper on highly effective teachers draws on existing 
research to list six correlating characteristics in the 
domain of Intellectual Quality: 1) displaying a rich 
factual knowledge about teaching; 2) possessing an 
in-depth knowledge of subject matter; 3) having a 
rich procedural knowledge about teaching strategies; 
4) currency of knowledge; 5) the willingness to be 
a learner; and 6) the encouragement of higher level 
reflection on metacognitive processes and products 
(p. 36). The purpose of this investigation is to build 
on Faull’s research by unpacking three of these areas: 
an in-depth knowledge of subject matter; currency 
of knowledge; and the willingness to be a learner. 
The term “epistemic responsibility”—specifically, 
the imperative on a teacher to “know well”—will be 
explored within this framework.
Theoretical Framework
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned 
with the sources, nature and scope of knowledge. 
More broadly, it can be usefully employed to 
explore “issues having to do with the creation 
and dissemination of knowledge in particular 
areas of inquiry” (Steup, 2013). Lorraine Code 
has made a significant contribution to this field 
of inquiry, most recently in her book Ecological 
Thinking (2006) which explores the political 
implications of an individual’s claim to “know”. 
Her earlier work, Epistemic Responsibility (1987), 
however, provides some guiding principals that 
can inform some of the issues raised in this paper. 
The book draws heavily on virtue ethics to tease 
out the implications of what it means to claim to 
“know well”. Code argues that “knowing well” 
is a responsibility for any individual making a 
knowledge claim, and aims “to examine conditions 
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for knowing well, not to provide a formula for 
acquiring indubitable knowledge” (p. 221). 
Following Code, this paper does not propose that 
formulas are necessary—or even possible—for 
establishing epistemic competence. Indeed, as 
Biggs and Tang (2011) write, “wise and effective 
teaching is not … simply a matter of applying 
general principles of teaching according to rule; 
they need adapting to each teacher’s own personal 
strengths and teaching context” (p. 45). A key 
competency for individuals who would “know 
well” is, according to Code (1987), the capacity 
for reflexive epistemic questioning. She writes that 
only by having self-knowledge can one improve 
on it: “To strive for insight into the extent of one’s 
own cognitive capacities, to distance oneself as 
much as possible so one can be critical of one’s 
own knowing, is a crucially important aspect of 
epistemic competence” (p. 176). To this end, this 
paper will sketch some scenarios in which key 
epistemic questions can help a teacher define their 
position in relation to their content knowledge, 
and explore a practitioner’s responsibility to “know 
well” according to stages of career development.
An additional theoretical framework defines 
the scope of this inquiry. This framework builds 
on Shulman’s (1986) influential article “Those 
who understand: Knowledge growth in teaching”.  
In this paper, Shulman asks some important 
epistemic questions: “What are the sources of 
teacher knowledge? What does a teacher know 
and when did he or she come to know it? How is 
new knowledge acquired, old knowledge retrieved, 
and both combined to form a new knowledge 
base?” (p. 8). Shulman’s focus is located at the 
intersection of content knowledge translation 
into teaching practice. This area was termed 
pedagogical content knowledge, which, as the 
name implies, emphasises the interdependence of 
content knowledge and pedagogical praxis. Ball, 
Thames and Phelps (2008) helpfully build on the 
foundation set by Shulman. They identify sub-
domains that differentiate between types of content 
and pedagogical knowledge for the purpose of 
analysis. Of these four domains: common content 
knowledge; specialised content knowledge; 
knowledge of content and students; and knowledge 
of content and teaching, this paper focuses 
on the first two: common content knowledge 
and specialised content knowledge. Ball et al. 
(2008) define common content knowledge as 
“the knowledge and skill used in settings other 
than teaching”, and are careful to acknowledge 
that “common” does not mean “everyone has 
this knowledge”. Rather, it indicates “that this 
knowledge is of a kind used in a wide variety of 
settings—in other words, not unique to teaching” 
(p. 399). Specialised content knowledge refers to 
the knowledge and skill unique to teaching that 
belongs to a specific discipline. 
A connection can be drawn between these 
four domains and the National Professional 
Standards for Teachers (NPST). The introduction 
to the NPST outlines seven standards grouped into 
three domains. Of these, common and specialised 
content knowledge can be mapped to the domain 
of “Professional Knowledge” and the first part of 
standard 2: “Know the content and how to teach it” 
(“NPST,” 2011, p. 3 italics supplied). Each standard 
is mapped to one of four stages of a career cycle: 
Graduate, Proficient, Highly Accomplished and 
Lead Teacher. Interestingly, out of six focus areas in 
this standard, only one directly relates to common 
and specialised content knowledge: “Demonstrate 
knowledge and understanding of the concepts, 
substance and structure of the content and teaching 
strategies of the teaching area” (NPST, 2011, p. 10, 
italics supplied). This focus area clearly combines 
common and specific content knowledge with 
knowledge of content and teaching; again we see 
the area of content knowledge almost subsumed by 
its pedagogical counterpart. 
This point is made explicitly by an analysis 
of the Self-Assessment Tool provided by the 
Australian Institute for Teaching and School 
Leadership (AITSL, 2013). The Tool is provided for 
teachers to informally self-review their professional 
progress against the National Professional 
Standards for Teachers according to their stage 
of career development. It is interesting to note 
that while “Professional Knowledge” is the first 
of three domains of teacher competency in 
the NPST, of the 74 questions in the survey, no 
question directly assesses the range or growth of 
a teacher’s common content knowledge. It might 
be concluded that common content knowledge 
may be considered subordinate to other types of 
professional knowledge, but a more likely scenario 
is that it is assumed in the Self-Assessment Tool. 
As mentioned in a previous example, this may be 
because “it [seems] obvious that teachers need to 
know the topics and procedures that they teach” 
(Ball et al., 2008, p. 395). But again, if breadth and 
depth of content knowledge is so firmly embedded 
within teaching standards, should there not be 
specific questions that promote “transformative 
reflection” (Biggs & Tang, 2011, p. 45) in this area? 
On the surface, exploring this domain of teacher 
proficiency might appear to be counter-intuitive. 
An academic degree, after all, confers a status of 
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“teacher-readiness” on a graduate, and schools are 
entitled to assume that an experienced teacher’s 
content knowledge has advanced and is continually 
growing. But how can such an assumption account 
for the graduate teacher who still feels “out of 
their depth” in terms of content at the end of their 
first year? Or a proficient primary school teacher 
who experiences anxiety about moving from a 
new entrants’ program to teaching grade five or 
six content? That such teachers have the skills to 
acquire content knowledge is not at question here: 
the point is simply that the scope of new knowledge 
required by these teachers is, in theory, without 
boundary, and in practice, often assumed. Ball et 
al. (2008) note that much of the research carried 
out in this area has focused on gathering data about 
teachers’ conceptual frameworks and how these 
translated into practice in the classroom (p. 393). 
This paper engages with the discussion at a different 
location; rather than providing examples of best 
practice at the point of instruction, the investigation 
focuses on reflexive practices at what will be 
termed points of “epistemic challenge”. The aim is 
to probe some areas where knowledge is presumed 
or taken for granted, identify some potential triggers 
of “epistemic challenge” or crisis, and suggest 
some reflexive questioning examples to address 
such events. Each of these elements works toward 
answering the key question: What does it mean for 
a teacher to “know well”? 
Code in Action: A Case Study
Before applying Code’s approach to the context of a 
classroom, a case study from Epistemic Responsibility 
(1987) will be outlined to illustrate the concept of 
epistemic responsibility. It raises a number of important 
issues and highlights some key epistemic points for 
scholars and practicing educators. 
Father and Son: A Study of Two Temperaments 
(2004) is a memoir by Edmund Gosse. First published 
in 1907, the book contains Edmund’s reflections on 
his childhood, and particular emphasis is given to his 
relationship with his father, Philip Henry Gosse. Gosse 
senior was a fellow of the Royal Society, a man of 
great intellect whose scientific peers held him in high 
esteem. At the age of 22 he had a powerful conversion 
experience and became a Christian. Much later Gosse 
courted and married Emily Bowes, a member of his 
deeply conservative faith community, the Plymouth 
Brethren. Emily also displayed a keen intellect and 
tirelessly wrote religious tracts until the time of her 
death when Edmund was just seven years old. 
A predominantly self-taught scientist, Gosse 
senior is characterised by Code as a “painstaking 
and indefatigable researcher…a man well in touch 
with the current state of art in his area of expertise” 
(1987, p. 19). He encountered a significant epistemic 
crisis, however, when his faith was challenged by the 
concept of natural selection, communicated personally 
by Charles Darwin. While Gosse’s scientific instincts 
were to investigate ideas, the perceived challenge 
to his religious convictions in this case determined 
him to have nothing to do with the new theory, and 
without further investigation, he clung to his existing 
view of the fixity of species (Gosse, 2004, p. 103). This 
decision was one in a chain of events wherein Gosse 
was ostracised by his scholarly community and the 
wider reading public; he subsequently broke ties with 
all elements of his life in London and moved to Devon. 
Gosse carried on his scholarly work, but the damage 
done to his reputation by his refusal to engage in 
serious investigation of new ideas was irreparable.
Code raises some key epistemic points in her case 
study of Gosse. Briefly, these are summarised in the 
following way: 
1) that knowledge claims and efforts to know 
are events or processes in human lives; they emerge 
out of interaction amongst knowledge seekers, their 
communities, and the world; 
2) there is no knowledge without knowers, no 
knowledge without context; and 
3) that knowledge cannot be stored equally in a 
computer or a human mind, because people have 
attitudes to knowledge that shape both its structure 
and its content (p. 26).
Given that Code is writing from a liberal humanist 
perspective it is perhaps significant that she does not 
take issue with the integrity of Gosse’s religio-scientific 
beliefs. She is careful to contextualise her critique 
within a complex web of factors that is unique to his 
situation. Gosse, she says, may be assessed as being 
epistemically irresponsible for not being open to the 
possibility of new knowledge for fear of eroding his 
own beliefs. “It is at least arguable,” she writes, “that 
one who has examined alternative positions might be 
a better believer, in the long run, than one who has 
shied dogmatically away from them” (p. 22). What is 
at issue here is the creation/evolution debate losing a 
potentially powerful contender in Gosse, because his 
refusal to engage with Darwin’s ideas—or gain content 
knowledge—necessarily excluded him from the 
scientific discussion. 
A corollary and personal consequence of Gosse’s 
desire to “know well”—but only in areas that matched 
his belief—is his son’s rejection of Gosse senior’s belief 
system and ultimate rejection of his faith. This result is 
of course unique to this situation, but the point is clear 
that epistemic responsibility has consequences beyond 
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This is perhaps nowhere more significant than in a 
classroom. Had Phillip Henry Gosse met his epistemic 
crisis with some personal reflexive questioning, 
perhaps a different outcome would have ensued. 
Cooper (1993) uses Code’s approach to construct 
some relevant epistemic questions that can be applied 
to different situations. He adopts Code’s position 
that reflexivity is a key to epistemic competence and 
promotes the kind of Socratic questioning characteristic 
of intellectual virtue. These questions include: “Do I 
really know what I think I know?”; “Do I know enough 
to act as I do?”; “What don’t I know?”; “What are the 
moral consequences of my knowing/ignorance?”; 
“Should I know more or acknowledge incomplete 
knowledge?” (p. 86). Applying the question: “Do I 
know enough to act as I do?” to Gosse’s situation, 
an epistemically sound response would need to 
acknowledge that the act of rejection requires a 
thorough investigation of the subject before that 
action be taken. “Should I know more or acknowledge 
incomplete knowledge?” is also a relevant question. 
Gosse’s refusal to investigate contrary viewpoints, his 
incomplete knowledge, prompted the disrespect—and 
in some cases, disdain and ridicule—of his peers. It 
may be concluded from Gosse’s case that an epistemic 
crisis may be precipitated by a moral dilemma, lack 
of self-knowledge, failure to ask any (or the “right”) 
epistemic questions, or any combination of these 
circumstances.
Two further points can be made in relation to this 
type of epistemic questioning. The first is the close 
connection between intellectual virtue and character. 
A responsibilist approach, Code writes, requires the 
character qualities of honesty and humility: “honesty 
not to pretend to know what one does not know (and 
knows one does not) or to ignore its relevance”, and 
humility not to suppress evidence challenging to one’s 
preconceptions (p. 137). She suggests that humility 
checks the possible excesses of “whimsicality” at 
one extreme of the spectrum and “close-minded 
dogmatism” at the other (p. 234). The second point is 
that accurate self-knowledge is crucial in any reflexive 
assessment of epistemic responsibility. This needs to be 
open to revision and reflection over time (p. 58). 
To summarise, the key ideas that have been 
made are as follow: 1) there is a great deal of choice 
involved in knowledge acquisition; 2) this calls for 
epistemic responsibility on the part of the would-be 
knower; 3) reflexivity is a core epistemic competence; 
4) knowledge-growth should be approached with 
an attitude of humility; 5) self-knowledge is vital to 
effective reflexive questioning; and 6) the inherent 
complexity of unique situations means that all 
epistemic challenges should be assessed individually. 
The remainder of this paper will discuss some 
scenarios in the classroom which play out an epistemic 
challenge and explore some of the ways Code’s 
approach might illuminate the situation and contribute 
to epistemic responsibility and professional growth. 
Scenario 1
Richard is a first year teacher at a suburban secondary 
school. His subject specialty is mathematics and 
he is happy to be teaching a year 7 advanced 
mathematics class. During one lesson, a student asks 
Richard a question that may be asked in a number 
of mathematics classrooms: “When would I use this 
process in real life?” Richard responds that it is not 
the practical application that matters, but rather the 
acquisition of the skill that is important. The student 
appears dissatisfied with that answer, and Richard 
observes the student appears to have lost a little 
enthusiasm for the class. He finishes the lesson feeling 
some disappointment in himself and determines to 
come prepared with a better answer the next day.
This scenario requires a particular type of common 
content knowledge—it might be called “applied 
common content knowledge”. Richard has always 
been interested in—and proficient at—mathematical 
processes for their inherent systematic integrity and 
was not able to answer the fairly common question 
regarding application. This epistemic challenge gives 
him a reason to enquire into a domain of professional 
learning for which he is not prepared. An assessment 
of epistemic responsibility might ask: “Given that 
Richard is qualified and demonstrably proficient 
in teaching the process, is he also responsible 
for providing an application for mathematical 
processes?” In the unlikely situation that curriculum 
specified only that students need to be proficient in 
undertaking mathematical processes, an argument 
could be made that Richard is not responsible for 
delivering content knowledge beyond process. But 
a responsibilist approach would suggest that, in fact, 
this is an important part of understanding. For Code, 
understanding 
involves tying one’s knowledge down: relating it to 
a context, having some conception of the relation 
of this one “bit” of knowledge to the rest of what 
one knows. … Understanding, then, involves a just 
apprehension of significance and endorses an ideal 
of seeing things “whole” in some sense. (p. 150)
Further, she writes that “bringing to understanding 
… is as central a part of the commonability of 
knowledge as is learning the opening hours of the bank 
from one’s neighbor” (p. 177). Again, of course it is 
unlikely that the curriculum and/or teacher proficiency 
standards would not address the application of 
such processes, but the point is that the demands of 
“
”
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epistemic responsibility often go beyond prescribed 
norms and must be met according to the situation’s 
particular needs.
Scenario 2
Rose has been teaching for seven years. Since 
graduating from university, she has taught new entrants 
and established herself as an early childhood specialist. 
However, as her school is experiencing unprecedented 
growth, she has been assigned a grade six class for 
the upcoming year to accommodate the need for 
a third stream at this level. This poses an epistemic 
challenge for Rose. She is known at the school as a 
competent and enthusiastic teacher and has recently 
won an award for innovation in the classroom. Rose 
experiences this change of classes, however, as a crisis, 
because she will be working with two well-established 
teachers who are familiar with grade six curriculum. 
They have a competitive, cordial professional 
relationship with each other, and while they are 
enthusiastic about Rose joining their team, Rose is not 
sure how she will fit into this active, slightly aggressive 
teaching environment. 
The core concern Rose holds is that her knowledge 
base regarding grade six content is deficient. She has a 
wide range of professional, pedagogical competencies, 
but little to no understanding about how parliament 
works, is intimidated by mathematics knowledge 
required at this level, and is unfamiliar with a number 
of terms and processes involved in a science unit with 
a biological focus. A common-sense assessment of 
Rose’s epistemic responsibility in this scenario would 
suggest that she simply needs to learn the content 
required for teaching this class and trust her colleagues 
to define the parameters of required knowledge for her. 
But Rose is a high achiever with a history of excellence 
in teaching and does not feel that this is enough. She 
understands the concept of “horizon learning”—that is, 
an awareness of how topics are related over the span 
of the curriculum—and is overwhelmed at the amount 
of new common content knowledge necessitated in 
linking back and forward to student knowledge. She is 
wondering if she should request being returned to her 
previous class. Are there any questions Rose can ask 
herself to assess her epistemic responsibility and set 
achievable goals for the year?
Given this scenario, a key question to ask is: 
“How much knowledge is it responsible to have for 
an experienced practitioner teaching new content?” 
Should Rose simply aim for the most basic common 
content knowledge acquisition? Here Code’s reminder 
“no set of rules could be produced for specifying, 
incontrovertibly, what should be done in every kind 
of situation” is helpful, although “it is reasonable to 
assume that there are right and wrong answers to 
questions about these requirements imposed upon 
one’s conduct, even though the answers may not 
be precisely the same for every knower” (p. 44). Of 
course, the requirements of the curriculum impose 
their own standards, but as outlined, Rose sees these 
as imperatives and has a higher expectation of herself 
than only meeting minimal requirements. Here the 
constraints of the situation impose different epistemic 
requirements on Rose than they would her more 
experienced colleagues. Teaching in the context of 
“horizon learning” is likely the stage at which her 
colleagues have arrived, but Rose’s goals should be 
less advanced. However, given her achievements over 
the past five years, Rose might responsibly aim beyond 
the minimum requirements of this stage. 
A helpful approach to take for Rose is to assess her 
responsibility in relation to her self-knowledge. Code 
writes that 
it is … sometimes easier to believe that one cannot 
master a certain subject matter (i.e. to delude 
oneself into believing that it is too difficult) than to 
acknowledge the accessibility of the subject relative 
to an accurate assessment of one’s capacities and to 
tackle it. (p. 59) 
Rose’s aim might be an objective assessment of 
her current knowledge and capabilities: “one must 
know oneself to achieve a just estimation of the 
extent to which one does know, believe justifiably, 
deceive oneself, or fail in epistemic responsibility” (p. 
59). As mentioned earlier, self-knowledge is open to 
communal challenge; Rose’s own reflections might 
be helpfully modified by those around her who have 
a vested interest in her professional capabilities 
without the depth of subjectivity self-reflexivity 
inevitably assumes. That Rose feels the tension 
between her lack of common content knowledge 
and the demands of the curriculum indicates that she 
is exhibiting intellectually virtuous characteristics; 
the challenge in this case is to harness the energy 
produced by this tension to move forward into the 
challenge rather than let the demands of her new 
position overwhelm her.
Scenario 3
Sam is an experienced senior secondary school 
history teacher. He has been teaching for 35 years 
in a rural school. Sam has come to the point where, 
after many years in the classroom, things are just 
rolling along. He is respected by his colleagues and 
well-known and liked in the wider community. In 
accordance with Huberman’s (1989) five stages of 
development, Sam finds himself in a phase of serenity 
and self-acceptance, and perhaps even beginning to 
disengage. Sam’s knowledge is wide-ranging and he 
updates his curriculum documents to reflect changes 
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but his content has essentially remained the same 
for a number of years. Sam figures: if it works, why 
change it? He encounters an epistemic challenge, 
however, when he glances at his class roll a week 
before classes start, and recognises a student as 
the grandchild of one of his first students from his 
graduate year. This gives Sam reason to pause. Is it 
possible that he will be teaching much of the same 
content—from a virtually unchanged knowledge 
base—that he taught this student’s father? He 
wonders how different is that content from the subject 
knowledge he had as a graduate teacher. Sam realises 
that he is using many of the same resources he has 
been using for many years. What are some reflexive 
questions Sam can ask to assess his epistemic 
responsibility in this situation? 
Sam might consider: What are the moral 
implications of teaching the same content over a 
number of years? What might this situation reveal 
about my beliefs regarding the nature of history and 
historical inquiry? What ideological messages does 
this send about the nature of history to my students? 
What impact might deeper and wider scope of 
knowledge have on my teaching? 
For Code an epistemically responsible approach 
does include a degree of prudence, but to the extent 
that it produces excessive conservatism, prudence 
must be balanced by innovation. If a practitioner is 
“more concerned with avoidance of error than with 
creativity or exploration of new possibilities”, or if a 
“knower” has settled into “complacency or inertia” 
(p. 56), as in Sam’s case, this is potential an indicator 
of epistemic irresponsibility. Code acknowledges that 
there is a place for conservers of established practice 
among epistemic communities, but also notes that 
catalysts of cognitive change also play a vital role 
in such communities. The same principle applies 
to Sam’s situation: his knowledge is valuable and 
should be acknowledged as such, but this epistemic 
challenge carries with it the potential for cognitive 
change which can enhance and revitalise his—
and consequently his students’—experience in the 
classroom. Another possible outcome of epistemically 
responsible practice is the impact of Sam’s action on 
his—ostensibly younger—colleagues. As Code notes, 
in an epistemic community 
outstanding achievement tends to stimulate 
emulators to go beyond it as much as it encourages 
them to approach its level as nearly as possible; and 
just as often, too, it provokes debate and challenge. 
There is an interactive process of inspiration and 
aspiration visible here, more reciprocal than 
circular. (p. 188)
This is supported by research that suggests 
mastery experiences of lead teachers can increase 
collective efficacy beliefs of their colleagues (see for 
example Goddard, Hoy, & Hoy, 2000; Protheroe, 
2008).
Conclusions
A common thread running through each of these 
scenarios is that epistemic responsibility demands that 
a teacher be a lifelong learner. To any responsible 
teacher, this is not surprising. As Shulman (1986) 
reminds us, the division of “scholar” and “teacher” 
is a false dichotomy; he highlights that the academic 
titles “master” and “doctor” both have “teacher” 
at their etymological root (p. 6). But what these 
scenarios have attempted to show is that the demands 
of epistemic responsibility—and, indeed, intellectual 
virtue—require teachers to develop the capacity for 
highly reflexive self-assessment, informed not only 
by the demands of the curriculum and professional 
standards, but also self-knowledge and peer-
assessment. 
Philip Henry Gosse’s situation demonstrates that 
it is, at times, easier to remain insufficiently informed. 
There are circumstances where it may be reasonable 
to maintain a conservative position after considering 
evidence. But Gosse’s refusal to engage in thorough 
investigation of evolutionary theory deprived the 
critique of Darwinism of a deeply intellectual mind 
and a powerfully articulate voice. The principles of 
this scenario should not be lost on educators today. 
The scenarios sketched in this paper demonstrate 
the fact that epistemic challenges can manifest 
situations as diverse as a brief classroom exchange, a 
major task reassignation, or a personal challenge to 
an established teacher. No matter what the context, 
a conscious choice to act with intellectual virtue 
is predicated on the ability to firstly recognise the 
challenge, and secondly work out the parameters 
of personal responsibility within a reliable reflexive 
framework. 
The purpose of this paper has been to articulate 
the concept of epistemic responsibility and make an 
initial attempt to apply it to the classroom teacher. 
Clearly, its demands are different at progressive 
career stages, but the injunction to “know well” 
applies to all educators. Corollary questions may 
follow on from this exercise: What constitutes teacher 
expertise in a particular discipline? Is “expertise” a 
goal to be reached? An ever-elusive bar that shifts 
with each new domain of knowledge attained? A 
subjective standard that depends on context and 
personal experience? These issues could frame a 
future discussion which continues to tease out some 
of the implications embedded in the assumption 
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